{"id":18664,"date":"2025-10-10T08:14:38","date_gmt":"2025-10-10T07:14:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/investx.fr\/en\/?p=18664"},"modified":"2025-10-10T08:42:27","modified_gmt":"2025-10-10T07:42:27","slug":"researcher-from-mit-explains-why-zcash-outperforms-monero-and-even-bitcoin","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/investx.fr\/en\/crypto-news\/researcher-from-mit-explains-why-zcash-outperforms-monero-and-even-bitcoin\/","title":{"rendered":"Researcher from MIT Explains Why Zcash Outperforms Monero and Even Bitcoin ?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Monero’s Ring Signatures<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

S. Virza’s critique directly targets the fundamental architecture of Monero<\/a>. Each XMR transaction includes the real spend alongside 16 randomly generated decoys to mask the origin of funds. On paper, this approach seems robust. IIn practice, Virza identifies two major weaknesses that seriously compromise the promised confidentiality, at the opposite of Zcash.<\/strong>

First, 16 decoys constitute an objectively limited anonymity set<\/strong> against modern analysis techniques. Researchers have developed heuristics capable of progressively isolating the real transaction from this limited group.
Second, the OSPEAD attack exploits random distribution biases: In reality, the 16 decoys statistically behave like just 4.2 real options<\/strong>. This degradation transforms theoretical protection into an exploitable vulnerability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Virza references academic studies documenting these traceability flaws. The problem isn’t hypothetical<\/strong>: Some Monero transactions have already been retroactively deanonymized. For an ecosystem that places confidentiality at the core of its value, this structural limitation represents an existential challenge<\/strong> that simple updates cannot solve without a complete protocol redesign<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Zcash Shielded Pool Protects Anonymity<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Zcash (ZEC)<\/strong> uses a radically different model. Fully protected (z-to-z)<\/strong> transactions benefit from the entire shielded pool as their anonymity set, amounting to millions of potential notes<\/strong>. Using zero-knowledge proofs, the network mathematically verifies transaction validity without ever revealing which previous note is being spent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While Monero obscures metadata that still remains on-chain, Zcash structurally removes it from the public ledger<\/strong>. As Sean Bowe, Zcash’s principal engineer, explains:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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“Even a quantum computer analyzing the blockchain a thousand years from now wouldn’t be able to determine who made each shielded transaction, because that data simply never touched the ledger.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Zcash also has a DeFi composability advantage: Unlike Monero, it can integrate with decentralized protocols via atomic swaps and cross-chain bridges. This interconnection allows Bitcoin holders to “encrypt” part of their exposure through the ZEC shielded pool.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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JUST IN:
Zcash's Orchard Pool reached an ATH of 3M shielded ZEC.
@ current prices, the Orchard Pool market cap is nearly $500M.

It allows users to store and transfer Zcash privately, where details like the sender, receiver, and transaction amount are hidden using zero-knowledge\u2026 https:\/\/t.co\/hmoGfpUmpJ<\/a><\/p>— Vini Barbosa |\u300c thecoding \u300d (@vinibarbosabr) October 8, 2025<\/a><\/blockquote>