{"id":30731,"date":"2026-07-09T19:18:56","date_gmt":"2026-07-09T18:18:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/investx.fr\/en\/2026\/07\/09\/bitcoin-corporate-preferred-shares-stress-test\/"},"modified":"2026-07-09T19:18:59","modified_gmt":"2026-07-09T18:18:59","slug":"bitcoin-corporate-preferred-shares-stress-test","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/investx.fr\/en\/crypto-news\/bitcoin-corporate-preferred-shares-stress-test\/","title":{"rendered":"Bitcoin’s Debt Machine Faces Its First Real Stress Test"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In June 2025, public treasuries continued accumulating Bitcoin<\/strong> \u2014 but that was not where the real action unfolded. A market segment that barely existed two years ago experienced its first genuine shock: the preferred shares<\/strong> that companies now use to finance their BTC purchases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A report from BitcoinTreasuries.net<\/strong> describes June as the first stress test<\/strong> for the digital credit<\/strong> market. The verdict is mixed, but it offers critical insight into the next phase of corporate Bitcoin adoption<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What played out beneath the surface reveals the structural fragilities of a still-young financial model \u2014 and just how quickly it can unravel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

9,000 BTC Bought in June, But the Real Story Lies Elsewhere<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Public treasuries added close to 9,000 gross BTC<\/strong> in June, representing approximately 7,300 net BTC<\/strong>, valued at around $427 million<\/strong> at the month-end price of $58,398<\/strong>. A moderate pace of growth, with 80% of it driven by just two players.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Strategy<\/strong>, led by Michael Saylor<\/a><\/strong>, accumulated 3,625 net BTC<\/strong> for approximately $200 million. Strive<\/strong> followed with 3,364 BTC<\/strong> for a similar amount. Excluding these two heavyweights, the rest of the market combined purchased only around 2,000 BTC. Across the full second quarter, the report estimates net additions at 110,000 BTC<\/strong> \u2014 a faster pace than the two preceding quarters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Market context is critical here: Bitcoin<\/a><\/strong> was trading well below its October 2025 peak of around $126,000<\/strong> and briefly dipped under $60,000 during the month. That pullback directly fuelled the crisis in the digital credit<\/strong> segment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Bitcoin's<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

STRC Collapses to $75: The Mechanics of Leverage Laid Bare<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

To understand the crisis, you need to understand the model. Companies like Strategy<\/strong> are no longer using their own treasury cash to buy Bitcoin<\/strong>. Instead, they issue preferred shares<\/strong> \u2014 promising a fixed or variable dividend to investors \u2014 and redeploy the capital raised directly into BTC. STRC<\/strong> (Strategy) and SATA<\/strong> (Strive) have become the two leading instruments of this kind.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For weeks, these securities traded in a tight range around their par value of $100<\/strong>. That apparent stability encouraged investors to borrow in order to amplify their positions. When Bitcoin<\/strong> corrected, the accumulated leverage turned into a detonator. From June 18<\/strong> onward, both STRC<\/strong> and SATA<\/strong> fell below $100. Margin calls<\/a><\/strong> triggered cascading forced sales: STRC hit a floor of around $75<\/strong>, while SATA<\/strong> faced its own selling pressure compounded by spillover from STRC<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The report is explicit on this point: this was not a crisis driven by the underlying dividends \u2014 which continued to flow normally \u2014 but a positioning crisis<\/strong>. That distinction is fundamental. Strategy<\/strong> held 847,363 BTC at an average cost of $75,651<\/strong> and maintained a reserve of $1.1 billion<\/strong> as of mid-June. Strive<\/strong> held a dividend reserve covering 18 months. These were cash flow questions, not solvency questions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Fast Recovery, But the Structural Lessons Remain<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The recovery was as swift as the selloff. By July 2, STRC was trading around $87<\/strong> and SATA<\/strong> near $97<\/strong> \u2014 levels that held through the report’s publication date of July 9. Neither Strategy<\/strong> nor Strive<\/strong> missed a single dividend payment. Saylor responded by deploying share buybacks and digital credit<\/strong> repurchases, while also raising STRC<\/strong> dividends.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That rebound reassured the most conviction-driven investors. But the episode exposes a structural reality: the Bitcoin digital credit<\/a> market is still young, thinly liquid, and vulnerable to leverage<\/strong>. A prolonged period of stability near par created a false sense of security, prompting some participants to take disproportionate risks on instruments that were designed to be defensive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Looking ahead, the question is not whether these instruments will survive \u2014 the strength of the dividend reserves makes that almost certain. The real question is whether the market can absorb new entrants<\/strong> without reproducing the same dynamics of excessive leverage every time Bitcoin<\/strong> volatility spikes again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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